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United States v. Robinson, Gustafson v. Florida, and
United States v. Calandra: Death Knell of the
Exclusionary Rule?*
By Douglas A. Voorsanger**

I.

United States v. Robinson, Gustafson v. Florida and
United States v. Calandra
A. Introduction

The exclusionary rule was created by the judiciary as a means
of enforcing the Fourth Amendment1 by suppressing otherwise relevant evidence which was obtained by police officers making an illegal
search and seizure.' The judges who created the exclusionary rule
recognized the sacrifice that the exclusion of admittedly probative evi-

dence had on judicial decision making and the punishment of discovered crimes, but they stated that the exclusionary rule was the only
effective means of enforcing the constitutional right "to be secure...
against unreasonable searches and seizures." s These judges de-

termined that the interest in enforcing the Fourth Amendment by way
of the exclusionary rule outweighed the social sacrifices this protection
entailed.

In the recent companion cases of United States v. Robinson4 and
* This note was originally written as a research paper for a seminar in Judicial
Process at Hastings College of the Law, taught by Professor Roger J. Traynor, retired
Chief Justice, California Supreme Court.
** B.A., 1968, Principia College; J.D., 1974, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law.
1. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The exclusion of evidence obtained by electronic eavesdropping presents special problems which will not be analyzed in this note. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 605 (1970). See cases cited note 144 infra.
2. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3. See notes 84-88 and accompanying text infra.
4. 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973).
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Gustafson v. Florida,5 the United States Supreme Court by majorities
of 6-3 established a significant limitation to the application of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases in which the search is incident to a lawful custodial arrest for a traffic offense. 6 Within a month,
the identical six man majority in United States v. Calandra7 again refused to extend application of the exclusionary rule.. Over a vigorous dissent, the majority drastically altered the theoretical basis for
application of the exclusionary rule by declaring that the rule is justified solely by its deterrent effect on future police misconduct. The
Court determined that the minimal deterrent benefit of the rule in
grand jury proceedings was outweighed by its costs in terms of interference with the grand jury's functions. It held that a witness summoned to testify before a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained by an
unlawful search and seizure. 8
This note will examine the analysis and implications of these
three decisions, each of which has significance within the context of
its own factual setting, but which when examined together are of even
greater significance in indicating the attitude of the emerging majority
of the "Burger Court" toward the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases. This note will also discuss criticisms of the rule made by
various commentators and jurists, including those of Professor Dalhn
Oaks based on empirical studies testing the effectiveness of the rule
and those of Chief Justice Warren Burger in his dissent in the Bivens
case.' The following conclusions will be explored: (1) Robinson,
Gustafson, and Calandra present substantial evidence to indicate the
Supreme Court will decline to extend the exclusionary rule to new
contexts and will begin to cut back on some areas where the rule has
been applied previously; (2) based on the findings in Calandra that
the rule is justified solely by its deterrent effect, together with support from the empirical studies and criticisms indicating that the rule
in fact is ineffective in accomplishing its stated purpose of deterring
police misconduct, there is a strong possibility the Court will abolish
the exclusionary rule and replace it with a legislative alternative along
the lines of the plan recommended by Chief Justice Burger in his Bivens dissent; and (3) a state statute, similar to the bill recently proposed in California which abolishes the exclusionary rule in criminal
cases and replaces it with a damage action against the government
5. 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973).
6. See text accompanying notes 11-56 infra.
7. 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974).
8. See text accompanying notes 57-81 infra.
9. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 411-27 (1971).
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entity employing the defending officer, 10 would present an appropriate
vehicle to test these assumptions if such a statute were challenged and
then the action were appealed to the Supreme Court.
B. United States v. Robinson
1. Facts
On April 23, 1968, at approximately 11 o'clock P.M., Officer Richard Jenks of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department observed the defendant Willie Robinson, Jr., driving
a 1965 Cadillac in that city and signaled him to stop the vehicle. As
a result of an investigation four days earlier in which he had checked
Robinson's operator's permit, Officer Jenks believed Robinson was operating the car after the revocation of his operator's permit. Upon
being shown the same permit the defendant had exhibited four days
earlier, Officer Jenks placed Robinson under arrest for operating a
motor vehicle after revocation of his operator's license and for obtaining a permit by misrepresentation."
Since the arrest was one that
involved taking the defendant into the station house,' = by police department instructions the officer3 was required to make a full field
search as an incident to the arrest.'
A full field search according to the department standard operating procedures entailed a thorough search of the individual, including
an examination of the contents of all of the pockets, regardless
of whether the officer believed an object in the pocket was a weapon.' 4 Complying with these instructions, during his patdown search
Officer Jenks felt an object in the left breast pocket of the heavy coat
Robinson was wearing. Although Jenks testified he could not tell the
precise size or consistency of the object, he reached into the pocket
and pulled out the object, a wadded up cigarette package. He opened
10. See note 127 infra.
11. 94 S. Ct. at 469-70. One of these charges was a statutory offense defined
by Congress, the other a violation of a District of Columbia ordinance-both carrying
penalties of fines and up to 10 days in jail or up to one year's imprisonment. 40
D.C. Code § 302(d) (1967); Traffic Regulations of the District of Columbia
§ 157(e).
12. Metropolitan Police Department General Order No. 3, Series 1959 (April 24,
1959), in relevant part, states: "Only in the more serious of aggravated types of traffic
violations, those which indicate a serious disregard for the safety of others . . . should
it be necessary to make summary arrest. These include, but are not confined to:
'Fleeing from the Scene of an Accident'; 'Driving under the influence of Intoxicating
Liquor or Narcotic Drugs'; 'Reckless Driving';. . . 'OperatingAfter Suspension or Revocation of Operator's Permit. .. ." (emphasis added by the court). United States v.
Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1097 & n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
13. United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467, 470-71 n.2 (1973).
14. Id.; United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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the pack and found fourteen gelatin capsules of heroin. Officer Jenks
then placed the defendant under arrest for possession of narcotics and
continued the search without finding any weapons or any additional
narcotics.
Robinson was convicted on federal narcotics charges on the basis
of this evidence, but on a rehearing en blanc, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals ordered the evidence suppressed and reversed the
conviction on the ground that this search of the defendant violated the
Fourth Amendment. 5
In a 6-3 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals, holding that in the case of a lawful
custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a "reasonable" search under the amendment. 16
2.

FourthAmendment Requirements

The Fourth Amendment requires that, except in certain exceptional situations, a warrant must be obtained by a police officer before
he can make a search.' 7 One of the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest.'" A good
deal of case law has examined the extent of the area beyond the person of the arrestee which may be searched incident to arrest.' 9 In
Chimel v. California,0 the United States Supreme Court decided that
the scope of such warrantless searches includes only the area under the
arrestee's immediate control, the area from within which he might grab
a weapon or destroy evidence. On the other hand, statements by the
Court as to the existence and scope of authority to conduct warrantless
searches of the person incident to a lawful arrest are mainly dicta,
although the broad statements that were made generally do not attempt to limit the scope of such searches. 2"
Robinson, as well as Gustafson, presented the Court with
15. 471 F.2d 1082 (5-4 decision).
16. 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973).
17. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); accord, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
18. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Chimel v. United States, 395 U.S.
752 (1969).
19. E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364 (1964).
20. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
21. E.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973); Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 149 (1972); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). But see Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,
67 (1968).
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the problem of whether the permissible scope and nature of a warrantless search of a person incident to an arrest for a traffic violation should be limited in the same fashion as the Court in Chimel
limited the permissible scope of a search of the area.
3.

The Court of Appeals Decision

a. The Terry-Sibron-Peterstrilogy. Judge . Skelly Wright, writing for
the majority in the court of appeals decision, 2 analyzed the general
statements by the Supreme Court on the permissible scope of searches
28
of the arrested person. He relied on such cases as Terry v. Ohio,
which established guidelines for "stop and frisk" searches. Terry
stated the principle that a search will be considered "reasonable" only
if its scope is no broader than necessary to accomplish legitimate governmental objectives.24 Despite the fact that Terry involved a search
upon less than probable cause for arrest whereas Robinson involved
a search incident to a valid arrest, the majority concluded that the
rationale underlying the scope limitation principle applied to all
searches regardless of the evidentiary basis for their initiation.2 5
Judge Wright found further support in his reading of Peters v.
New York,"' a case that had been conslidated with Sibron v. New
York. 2 7 In Peters, the police officer arrested the defendant on the
basis of probable cause that he was engaged in criminal activity, patted
him down for weapons, and upon' feeling a hard object in Peters' pocket which the officer suspected was a knife, removed the object and
found an envelope containing burglar tools. 28 The Court in that case
stated:
[Officer Lasky] had the authority to search Peters, and the incident search was obviously justified by the need to seize weapons
and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape as well as by the need to prevent the destruction
of evidence of the crime. . . . Moreover, it was reasonably limited in scope by these purposes. Officer Lasky did not engage
thorough-going examination of Peters and
in an unrestrained2and
9
his personal effects.
Based on this language in Peters, Judge Wright concluded that
22. 471 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

23. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
24. In Terry, the police officer did not invade the suspect's person beyond the
outer surfaces of his clothing until his patdown search produced a reasonable suspicion
that the suspect was armed and dangerous. Id. at 29-30.
25. 471 F.2d at 1092.
26. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 48-49.
29. Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
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the Supreme Court had applied the scope limitation principle to the
arrest-based search and found the search of Peters reasonable because
it was "reasonably limited in scope by [its] purpose" and not so "unrestrained and thoroughgoing!' as to violate the Constitution.30 Since
the scope limitation principle was applicable to searches incident to
arrest, then the same procedures approved in Terry seemed appropriate to the court to test the constitutionality of the particular search;
therefore, the court was required to test whether the officer's action
was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which originally justified the interfer31
ence.
b. Application of the scope limitation principle. Judge Wright then continued with a thorough and well-reasoned application of this principle
to the facts of Robinson. He began by examining the legitimate objectives of an arrest-based search of the person and limited these objectives to two: the seizure of fruits, instrumentalities, and other evidence of the crime for which the arrest is made in order to prevent
its removal or destruction; and the removal of any weapons that the
3
arrestee might seek to use to resist arrest or effect his escape. 1
The first objective was quickly disposed of as to the legitimacy
of the search in Robinson. Although it is reasonable to assume that
in searches pursuant to most crimes the arrestee will be in possession
of the fruits, instrumentalities, or other evidence of the crime for
which he is arrested, the majority did not find that Officer Jenks could
have reasonably believed that Robinson would have additional evidence concerning the traffic offense once he had received Robinson's
fraudulently obtained operator's permit.33
30. 471 F.2d at 1092. See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). But
see Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 77 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (the dictum
approving the scope of the search by the officer was a mere factual observation and
not a statement of law).
31. 471 F.2d at 1093, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
32. Id. Some confusion had been created as to possible justifications or objectives
of a search by the language in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)
(emphasis added): "The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons. . . as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence ......
One student commentator noted that "[d]espite the mysterious 'for example,' a thorough search of the case law reveals no other justifications for
warrantless searches incident to arrest which do not collapse upon careful inspection
into one of the two bases articulated in Preston." Note, Scope Limitations for Searches
Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433, 434 n.12 (1969). See aLso Note, Searches of
the Person Incident to Lawful Arrest, 69 COLuM. L. Rlv. 866 (1969); Note, Search
and Seizure-Search Incident to Arrest for Traffic Violation, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 347,

349 & n.14.
33. See text accompanying note 11 supra. Cf. Gustafson v. Florida, 94 S. Ct.
488, 492 n.4 (1973).
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The court gave a more comprehensive analysis of the second justification for searches incident to arrest: the interest of government
in the safety of its police officers. Judge Wright relied primarily on
the factors and procedures authorized in Terry and Sibron, which approved a self-protective search for weapons once the officer could
"point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the
individual was armed and dangerous." 3 4 The permissible scope
of such a search included a patdown or "frisk" of the suspect's outer
clothing for weapons, with a further intrusion only after finding a weapon.
Judge Wright found Terry and Sibron particularly appropriate
in the routine traffic arrest situation, in which, as in the stop-and-frisk
situation, there is no evidentiary basis for a search. The most intrusive search allowable, therefore, is the limited frisk for weapons. Furthermore, Judge Wright stated that a Terry frisk search provides adequate protection to the officer and that any further intrusion on the
individual's privacy was not warranted by the minimal
additional pro35
tection a more extensive search would guarantee.
4. Supreme Court Opinion
Justice Rehnquist, in a comparatively brief majority opinion, rejected the analysis and findings of the court of appeals, particularly
its reliance on Terry. Justice Rehnquist began his analysis by reviewing the previous statements made by the Court in dicta concerning
the scope of searches incident to arrest, as well as by examining selectively3 0 certain state court cases that had been based on or had discussed the authority to make arrest-based searches. He concluded
that "[w]hile these earlier authorities are sketchy, they tend to support the broad statement of the authority to search . . . rather than
the restrictive one which was applied by the Court of Appeals in this
case."3 7 He supported this conclusion by construing the language in
-Peters quoted by Judge Wright as being merely a repetition of the
factual setting of that case and not a statement of law approving the
34. 471 F.2d at 1095, quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968).
35. Id. at 1099-1101.
36. There are a number of decisions rendered by state and federal courts which
Justice Rehnquist did not discuss which have held that, absent special circumstances,
a police officer may not conduct a full search of the person incident to a lawful arrest
for a traffic offense. E.g., United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055, 1058 (10th
Cir. 1969); People v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr.
837 (1972); State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 190 N.W.2d 631 (1971); State v. O'Neal,
251 Ore. 163, 444 P.2d 951 (1968) (en banc); Barnes v. State, 25 Wisc. 2d 116, 130
N.W.2d 264 (1964). Contra,State v. Gustafson, 258 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972).
37. 94 S. Ct. at 475.
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limited nature of such searches.18 Furthermore, since the broad statements made by the Court in dicta did not speak simply in terms of
an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
but in terms of an affirmative authority to search, Justice Rehnquist
found that such arrest-based searches also meet the Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness. 9
Justice Rehnquist also rejected the lower court's reliance on
Terry v. Ohio by determining that the context of a search incident
to a valid custodial arrest is significantly different from a permissible
"frisk" incident to an investigative stop based on less than probable
cause to arrest. He found the Terry reasoning unpersuasive in the
arrest context, noting that the Court itself, in validating limited search
procedures for protective purposes in Terry, had distinguished the different considerations involved in a search incident to arrest.
An arrest is a wholly different type of intrusion upon the [sic]
individual freedom from a limited search for weapons, and the
interests each is designed to serve are likewise different. An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended
to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and it
is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual's freedom of movement, whether or not trial or conviction
ultimately follows. The protective search for weapons, on the
other hand, constitutes a brief, though40 far from inconsiderable,
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person.
Unfortunately, the majority in Robinson did not clearly articulate the
various considerations involved in the arrest situation that justify a
greater amount of interference with the rights of the person involved.
The statement quoted from Terry was the basis for justifying a limited
warrantless search absent evidence sufficient to justify a belief the person
had committed a crime. This general statement, taken out of context
in order to prove that a full search of the individual is warranted absent
the probabality that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon
the suspect, is not a particularly persuasive proposition.41
38. Id. at 474. In accepting Justice Harlan's interpretation of this language given
in his concurring opinion to Peters, Justice Rehnquist stated: "We do not believe that
the Court in Peters intended in one unexplained and unelaborated sentence to impose
a novel and far reaching limitation on the authority to search the person of an arrestee
incident to his lawful arrest." Id. See note 30 supra.
39. 94 S. Ct. at 471-77.
40. Id. at 473, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).
41. But see W. LAFAvE, ARn.mnT: THE DEcIsION TO TAKE A SusPEcT INTO CusTODY 4-5 (1965). LaFave describes the arrest function as an important step in the
criminal justice process to be distinguished from the preliminary investigative devices
such as the stop-and-frisk primarily because of the entirely different perception both
the police and the person being searched have of this function in contrast to the stopand frisk, and also because of the more serious consequences involved in an arrest.
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Further in the opinion, Justice Rehnquist added a clue as to why
a shift in the balance is justified in the custodial arrest context. In
rejecting the court of appeals' conclusion that the only reason supporting the authority for a full search incident to lawful arrest is the possibility of discovering evidence or fruits, Justice Rehnquist maintained
that the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody
provided the authority for a full body search rather than the limited
Terry frisk. He stated that in the arrest context the danger to an
officer is far greater because of the extended exposure and the attendant stress and uncertainty that follows the taking of a suspect into
custody and transporting him to the police station than in the more
limited contact probable in the frisk situation. 42 "This is an adequate
all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search justibasis for treating
43
fication.
Justice Rehnquisf's analysis of this point again appears deficient.
Both the court of appeals majority and the Supreme Court dissent conceded there is an obviously increased danger in the arrest context,
but why is not the Terry frisk sufficient protection against this additional element of danger? As the dissent pointed out, the statistics
used to support the observation of increased danger to the officer in
the arrest context indicate that virtually all of the killings were
caused by guns or knives, the type of weapons which will be detected
by a properly conducted Terry frisk." The justification of protecting
the safety of the officer thus was apparently satisfied when Officer
Jenks removed the object he felt in the defendant's pocket pursuant
to the frisk search. If the cigarette package had contained a concealed weapon such as a razor blade, once the package was in the
officer's possession, there was no longer any risk of the defendant's
use of a weapon in the package. 45
Justice Rehnquist's discussion of reasons justifying the increased
invasion of privacy permitted in the arrest context contrasted with the
frisk context is not a thorough and detailed analysis of the probability
that weapons or evidence would be found in this particular search in
Robinson, but rather is based on a more fundamental concept that
42. Approximately 30% of the shootings of police officers occur when the officer
approaches a person seated in an automobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shooting-A
Factual Evaluation, 54 J.CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 93 (1963), cited in Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 148 n.3 (1972). According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a significant percentage of murders of police officers occur when the officers are making traffic stops. In the first quarter of 1973, of 35 murders of police officers, 11 were killed
during traffic stops. 94 S.Ct. at 476 & n.5; cf. 471 F.2d at 1098-99 & n.25.
43. 94 S. Ct. at 476.
44. ld. at 486; 471 F.2d at 1100 & n.26.
45. See 94 S.Ct. at 486-87 n.6 (dissenting opinion).
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once a valid custodial arrest is made an incidental search of the person
is also constitutional.
Justice Powell, in his concise concurring opinion to both Robinson and Gustafson, was more precise and persuasive in his analysis
of the essential premise of these decisions.
He asserted that an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no significant
Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person.
[The individual's interest in -privacy] is subordinated to a legitimate and overriding governmental concern. No reason then exists
to frustrate law enforcement by requiring some independent
justi46
fication for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest.
Justice Powelrs opinion supplements the reasons that justify the
more extensive search which Justice Rehnquist supports with the quotation from Terry and a citation of statistics indicating considerable
danger to the police.4 7 It is disappointing, however, that Justice
Powell does not elaborate on the nature of the "legitimate overriding
governmental concern" to clarify more precisely the interests that justify the result of limiting the individual's right of privacy.
In his concurring opinion in Gustafson, Justice Stewart indicated
a possible defense, one not raised by the defendant in Robinson, that
a custodial arrest for a minor traffic offense was a violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.48 Justice Powell also noted that
if the custodial arrest for the traffic arrest had been shown to be merely a pretext for a search actually undertaken for collateral objectives,
it would be disallowed. 49 Although Robinson did claim the arrest was
a pretexted justification for the search, the Supreme Court did not
rule on this point since the court of appeals had accepted the government's version."0 Neither did the Court reach the question of whether a full search would be justified by a "routine traffic stop" without
a full custodial arrest. Because the majority's reasoning is based on
the authority of searches incident to custodial arrest, it would not seem
to indicate a predilection to extend Robinson to such a context.
C. Gustafson v. Florida
Gustafson v. Florida,51 which was argued with Robinson and decided at the same time, is important primarily for its refinements of
46. Id. at 494 (emphasis added); cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
47. See 94 S. Ct. at 494 n.1, quoting Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386,
388-89 (9th Cir. 1960).
48. Gustafson v. Florida, 94 S. Ct. 488, 492 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
49. 94 S. Ct. at 494 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring); see United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932).
50. 94 S. Ct. at 494 n.2.
51. 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973).
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the statements in Robinson and its application of that holding in a
different factual setting.
The defendant, James Gustafson, had been convicted in a Florida trial court for unlawful possession of marijuana seized during a
body search pursuant to his arrest on a charge of driving without an
operator's license. A municipal police officer, Smith, had stopped
Gustafson during the early hours of the morning after observing Gustafson's erratic driving of a car bearing out-of-state license plates. Upon
request to produce his operator's license, the defendant informed
the officer that he was a student and had left his license in his dormitory room in a neighboring city. Gustafson was then placed under
custodial arres 2 in order to transport him to the police station for
further questioning. Officer Smith conducted a pat-down search of
the defendant, discovered and extracted a cigarette box from the coat
pocket of the coat Gustafson was wearing, opened the box, and observed what he believed to be marijuana. Officer Smith then placed
the defendant under arrest for possession of marijuana."e
In his appeal from the decision of the Florida Supreme Court
declaring the search reasonable,5 4 Gustafson contended, as did Robinson, that there could have been no evidentiary purpose for the search
conducted, by the officer. A search for weapons pursuant to what
he conceded was a lawful arrest should, therefore, be limited by Terry. Gustafson further argued that his case was distinguishable from
Robinson because the offense for which he was arrested carried no
mandatory minimum sentence nor did the municipality's police department policies require complete body searches pursuant to field arrests
as did the District of Columbia.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the identical 6-3 majority as
in Robinson, held that the police officer was entitled under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to make a full search of the defendanfs
person incident to the lawful arrest, and that as in Robinson, the arguable absence of an evidentiary purpose for the search was not con55
trolling.
52. The charge of driving without possession of an operator's permit was subsequently dropped when the defendant produced a valid license at a later date. Id. at

490 n.2.
53. Id. at 490.
54. State v. Gustafson, 258 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972).
55. Justice Rehnquist noted that Florida argued that there was an evidentiary purpose for the search based on Smith's observation of erratic driving of the car creating
a reasonable suspicion that the driver may have been under the influence of alcohol
or unlawful drugs. The State argued further that Smith's observation of the defendant's
"bleary" eyes gave him probable cause to arrest the defendant on this charge, and then
to conduct a full search for evidence of that crime. 94 S. Ct. at 492 n.4. The dis-
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The Court further held that even though police regulations did
not require Gustafson to be taken into custody or establish the conditions upon which a full-scale body search should be conducted, contrary to the situation in Robinson, this distinction was without constitutional significance.
It is sufficient that the officer had probable cause to arrest
the petitioner and that he lawfully effectuated the arrest, and
placed the petitioner in custody.5 6
D. United States v. Calandra
The third of this trio of cases dealing with the nature and scope
of the exclusionary rule was announced a month after Robinson and
Gustafson were decided. United States v. Calandra57 established that
a witness summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury may
not refuse to answer questions on the ground they are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure; in other words,
the exclusionary rule does not extend to grand jury proceedings.
1. Facts
On December 11 and 15, 1970, federal agents searched the residence, automobile, and place of business of the defendant, John Calandra, pursuant to a search warrant issued in connection with a gambling investigation. During the search of Calandra's office and files
one of the federal agents discovered certain evidence indicating that
the defendant was engaged in "loansharking." Knowing there was
a pending federal investigation of such extortionate credit transaction
activities, the agency seized this evidence.
Calandra was subsequently subpoenaed by the grand jury investigating the loansharking and was questioned on the basis of the evidence seized during the search of his office. When Calandra invoked
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the governsent persuasively disposed of the state's argument and Justice Rehnquist's intimation
that this contention was valid by pointing out the following: Smith neither arrested
Gustafson for driving while intoxicated nor did he give him a sobriety test; the defendant had no difficulty getting out of the car, standing up, nor did he slur his speech;
Smith had not arrested the defendant for a weaving charge because there was not
enough evidence, and therefore the driving behavior of the defendant could not present
probable cause that Gustafson was driving while intoxicated; and defendant's bleary
eyes could probably be explained by the fact that the arrest took place at 2 a.m. Id.
at 493.
56. Id, at 491-92. Since the fact of custodial arrest was the basis of the authority
for the search, as in Robinson, subjective fear of the defendant or the fact that he
might be armed was irrelevant. Id. at 492; United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. at
477; cf. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d at 1122 (dissent).
7. 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974),
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ment requested that he be both compelled to answer the questions
and granted transactional immunity.58 Calandra then moved to suppress the evidence. 9 The district court, with the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirming, held that the search warrant had been
issued without probable cause and that the search had exceeded the
scope of the warrant. The court ordered the evidence obtained from
the search to be suppressed and returned to Calandra and further ordered that Calandra need not answer any questions of the grand jury
based on this evidence. 60
Justice Powell, writing for the already familiar 6-3 majority,0 ' reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.62
2. Majority Opinion
a. Justification of the Exclusionary Rule. Justice Powell opened the
opinion with a comprehensive discussion of the historical development
and functions of the grand jury. He described the scope of the grand
jury's investigative powers in determining whether a crime occurred
and by whom it was committed, adding that these powers "must be broad
if its public responsibility is adequately to be discharged."63 The grand
jury may compel the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate,
and it is generally unrestrained in its operation by the evidentiary and
procedural technicalities governing criminal trials. Justice Powell
recognized that these broad powers have limits, however. While the
grand jury may consider incompetent or inadequate evidence without
being subject to challenge, it may not itself violate a valid constitutional,
statutory, or common law privilege.64
Justice Powell then moved to an analysis of the purpose of the
exclusionary rule, and in concise terms reached a significant conclusion:
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the
injury to the privacy of the search victim. . . . Instead, the rule's
primary purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and
thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment ....
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 2514 (1970).
59. 94 S. Ct. at 616.
60. United States v. Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1972); In re Calandra,
332 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
61. The line-up of the two teams includes the chief justice and Justices Powell,
Rehnquist, Blackmun, Stewart, and White for the majority, with Justices Brennan,
Douglas and Marshall for the dissent.
62. 94 S. Ct. at 617.
63. id. at 618, citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972).
64. Id. at 617-19.
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In sum, the rule is a judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather
than a personal constitutional right of the party ag65
grieved.

Concluding that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was solely
one of deterrence of future police misconduct, the majority rejected
what the dissent considered the most important purpose of the rule,
that of providing a means of giving content and meaning to the Fourth
Amendment's guarantees. The dissent conceived of the exclusionary
rule as accomplishing the twin goals of maintaining the "imperative
of judicial integrity" by avoiding the taint of partnership in official lawlessness, and of assuring the people-all potential victims of unlawful
government conduct-that the government would not profit from its
lawless behavior. The dissent further maintained that the deterrent

justification for the rule was "at best only a hoped for effect." 6 The
majority's response was that by rejecting an unprecedented extension
of the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings when the rule's objective could not be effectively served, and when historic values would
be unduly prejudiced, the Court was not betraying the "imperative
'67
of judicial integrity.
b. The Balancing Process. The majority recognized that the Supreme
Court has never interpreted the exclusionary rule to extend to all proceedings or against all persons who have been victims of illegal searches and
seizures, but only where application of the rule would most efficaciously
65. Id. at 619-20 (emphasis added). Powell cited and quoted from several cases
for support for this conclusion, including: Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968); Tehan v. United States, ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); and Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
66. 94 S. Ct. at 624-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d
641, 653-56, 463 P.2d 734, 741-43, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 390-92 (1970) (Peters, J., dissenting).
67. 94 S. Ct. at 623 n.11. At least one commentator has pointed out that while
the arguments supporting the justification of the "imperative of judicial integrity" appear in the rhetoric of Supreme Court decisions, it is doubtful that this argument decides cases, since federal courts may still enter valid judgments of conviction against
a defendant who was brought before the court by illegal means such as kidnapping,
arrest without probable cause, or arrest upon a warrant that was illegal or insufficient.
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665,
669 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Oaks], citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952);
Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 8 (1927); Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 339,
343 (1920); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Furthermore, other highly respected
judicial systems in common law jurisdictions such as England and Canada have not
found it necessary to exclude improperly obtained evidence to preserve the integrity
of their courts. Oaks, supra, at 669. "mhe raison d'etre of the exclusionary rule is
the deterrence of lawless law enforcement .... ." Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large
in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.I 319, 334, See generally Oaks, supra, at 671-72,

Spring 19741

RETREAT FROM EXCLUSIONARY RULE

serve its remedial objectives.6 8 Justice Powell reasoned that a balancing process must be applied to determine whether the potential benefits of extending the rule to grand jury proceedings outweighed the
potential injury to its historic role and functions.6 9 The potential detriment included transforming the traditional investigative and accusatorial function of the grand jury into a preliminary trial on the merits,
causing delay and disruption necessitated by extended litigation of issues only tangentially related to the grand jury's primary objective,
and interfering with the effective discharge of the grand jury's duties.
Against this potential damage the majority could find that only
an uncertain and at most minimal benefit would result. The rule currently allows suppression of illegally obtained evidence from criminal
trials. To extend the rule to this new context, aimed at deterring
improper searches and seizures of evidence to be used by the grand
jury, would add little incremental deterrent effect. The Court reasoned that a prosecutor would not be likely to request an indictment
by the grand jury on the basis of such evidence when that evidence
could not be used at trial to obtain a conviction.
The Court concluded that the damage which would result from
extension of the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings outweighed the benefit of any possible incremental deterrent effect. The
Court also held that grand jury questions based on illegally obtained
evidence worked no new Fourth Amendment wrong beyond that
caused by the original invasion of the individual's privacy. Based on
the same considerations of logic and policy, it declined to extend the
70
exclusionary rule to the derivative use of the evidence.
3.

Dissenting Opinion

In his dissenting opinion Justice Brennan stated that the majority
misused controlling case authority as well as overlooked relevant analogous authority which compelled an opposite result. Silverthorne
68. Powell cited the "standing requirement" as an example. 94 S. Ct. at 620.
In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), the Court refused to extend the
exclusionary rule to one who was not the victim of the unlawful search because of
the minimal deterrent effect that would result from such exclusion.
69. 94 S. Ct. at 620-21.
70. Id. at 621-23. Powell mentioned at least two other remedies the grand jury
witness would have as redress for the injury to his privacy and to prevent further future
violations. He could use the exclusionary rule to prevent the evidence and its fruits
from being used in a criminal trial where he was a defendant, and have that property
returned to him, and he could sue the wrongdoing police officers in a civil suit for
damages. Id. at 623 n.10; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
344 (1931). See also Note, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents: A New Direction
in FederalPolice Immunity, 24 HASTINGs L.. 987 (1973).
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Lumber Co. v. United States,71 the case purportedly misused, was

quite similar factually to Calandra. In Silverthorne, federal agents had
illegally seized evidence from the Silverthornes and their lumber company (defendants) and presented this evidence to the grand jury
which had previously indicted them. A district court ordered the evidence suppressed and returned, but the grand jury subsequently issued
a subpoena duces tecum to produce the documents. When the defendants refused, they were cited for contempt. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding the subpoenas invalid because they were based on
the fruits of an illegal seizure.
The Calandra majority had distinguished Silverthorne because in
that case the primary consequence of the decision was the exclusion
of evidence in the criminal prosecution already authorized by the
grand jury. The grand jury did not need the evidence to perform
its investigative or accusatorial functions. Calandra, on the other
hand, had not been previously indicted and did not have standing 2
as a criminal defendant to invoke the exclusionary rule. Exclusion
of evidence in Calandra7would interfere with the effective functioning
of the grand jury's duties.

1

Justice Brennan argued quite persuasively that the majority had
overlooked the fact that the grand jury's interest in regaining the documents in Silverthorne may have been to secure information for grand
jury indictments on criminal charges against the Silverthornes and others, rather than to use the illegally obtained evidence in the previously
authorized criminal prosecution. He thought that Silverthorne controlled, and since it was not overruled 74
by the majority, an affirmance
of the lower court's holding was in order.

Justice Brennan also found the reasoning in Gelbard v. United
The Court in that case allowed a grand jury
witness to refuse to answer questions based on information obtained
from the witness' communications unlawfully intercepted through wiretapping and electronic surveillance. Justice Powell had distinguished
Gelbard as a case based exclusively on a statute designed to provide
special protection against the unique problems posed by misuse
77
of wiretapping and electronic surveillance.
States75 persuasive. 7 '

71. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
72. See note 68 supra.
73. 94 S. Ct. at 622 n.8. The majority also discounted the broad dicta used by
the Court in Silverthorne which had considered the exclusionary rule's justification as
being based on values other than its deterrent effect which, it contended, subsequent
decisions of the Court had undermined. Id.
74. Id. at 626-27.
75. 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
76. See 94 S. Ct. at 627.
77. Id. at 623 n.11.
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The dissenting justices seemed most displeased with what they
perceived as the majority's total misconception of the purpose or justification of the exclusionary rule. In analyzing the reasoning of the
majority which the dissenters found "plainly at war" with Mapp and
previous decisions which had regarded the exclusionary rule as an essential part of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, Justice Brennan expressed disapproval not only of the results reached in this case,
but also of the more drastic results he 78
foresaw should the majority's
reasoning be carried to its logical extreme:
I am left with the uneasy feeling that today's decision may signal
that a majority of my colleagues have positioned themselves to
reopen the door still further and abandon altogether the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases; for surely they cannot
believe that application of the exclusionary rule at trial furthers
the goal of deterrence, but that its application
in grand jury pro70
ceedings will not "significantly" do so.
Justice Brennan's expression of alarm would not seem to be a
mere rhetorical device. By framing the underlying justification for
application of the exclusionary rule as based solely on its deterrent effect on police misconduct, rather than on the "imperative of judicial
integrity" or some inherent right of the person searched to have this
evidence excluded, the majority radically altered the balancing process used to determine "reasonableness" of a search and Seizure. In
essence the majority made it more difficult for petitioners to establish
a case requiring extension of the rule to new search and seizure contexts. It also opened up the possibility that prior decisions in which
considerations other than the deterrent effect were used in the balancing process might require reconsideration based on this new standard.
But even more troublesome to the dissent was the possibility that
the majority's view of the exclusionary rule could result in its total
abandonment by attacking the incremental deterrent value effected by
its application in criminal trials. The majority had in fact noted that
there was some disagreement as to the practical efficacy of the rule
in criminal trials, but determined that the facts of Calandra did not
present such an issue for decision. s0
In anticipation of future attacks by the majority upon the very
existence of the exclusionary rule, Justice Brennan concluded his dissenting opinion by quoting Dallin Oaks, one of the most frequently
cited critics of the rule. In the cited portion of the quotation Oaks
listed numerous advantages which the rule provides apart from any
78. Id. at 624-26.
79. Id. at 628.
80. Id. at 620 n.5.
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direct deterrent effect. 8 ' Justice Brennan neglected to quote the first
sentence of the paragraph by Oaks, however, which puts Oaks' comments into a context that greatly weakens their value to the dissent's
position. Professor Oaks was speaking as an advocate of abolishing
the exclusionary rule, but not until an alternative was developed which
would perform the essential functions of the rule. Putting these remarks in their original context, Justice Brennan's use of this authority
suggests that the minority members of the Court were establishing a
position in anticipation of future cases challenging the rule. Implicit
in their position is that the exclusionary rule should not be abolished
without establishing viable alternatives, and that an ineffective or partially effective remedy is better than no remedy at all to maintain Fourth Amendment guarantees of individual freedom from illegal
goverment intrusion.
E. Implications of Robinson, Gustafson, and Calandra
These three cases are not only significant in their individual holdings and implications, but also, when taken together, they represent
a definite benchmark indicating the philosophy and attitude of the
majority of the "Burger Court" regarding the application of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases.
The holdings in Robinson and Gustafson do not create new law
but rather more clearly delineate the nature of one of the exceptions
to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirements, that of searches incident to arrest. The holdings firmly establish the authority to make
unrestricted searches of individuals arrested for fairly minor traffic offenses. The only requirement is that the ordinance or statute allows
the officer in his discretion to make a custodial arrest. Only Justice
Stewart indicated some reservation as to whether custodial arrest for
a minor traffic offense conflicted with the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment, and would present grounds for abuse by jurisdictions which grant overly broad authority for making custodial arrests
in order to justify full warrantless searches.
As a result of these decisions it is also possible that police officers
will use this authority to justify making full warrantless searches where
their motive is to find evidence of other crimes. They may make
use of the arrestee's speeding or failure to renew his operator's li81. "[1]t provides an occasion for judicial review, and it gives credibility to the
constitutional guarantees. By demonstrating that society will attach serious consequences to the violation of constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule invokes and magnifies the moral and educative force of the law. Over the long term this may integrate
some fourth amendment ideals into the value system or norms of behavior of law enforcement agencies." Oaks, supra note 67, at 756, quoted in 94 S. Ct. at 629.
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cense, for example, merely as an excuse for the search. This possibility for abuse is somewhat limited by a court's determination of
whether the arrest was based on a pretext or not, and if so based,
by that court's suppression of the evidence obtained in the
search. More difficulty lies in establishing that an arrest for a minor
traffic offense is a pretext, however, than in challenging the justification of an officer's search for weapons or evidence.
Robinson and its companion case Gustafson are perhaps just as
significant, however, for the manner in which the decisions were articulated. In rejecting Judge Wright's careful analysis and the reasoning
urged by the dissent, Justice Rehnquist refrained from a detailed justification of the reasonableness of the particular searches. Instead,
he categorically recognized the validity and reasonableness of a full
body search incident to any lawful arrest. In taking this approach
the majority relied on ambiguous dicta and refused to accept possible
contradictions raised in dicta statements of equal authority. Justice
Rehnquist also selectively cited persuasive state authority on the issue
in question, discussing only those cases which reached the result he
desired. Furthermore, he rejected the case law established in an arguably similar context as the traffic arrest, namely the Terry limitations on stop-and-frisk searches. The method used by the majority
to reach its conclusion indicates that, far from being a solution required by stare decisis, the opinion represented a distinct choice between two conflicting interests. The decision was to shift the balance
in favor of the increased safety of police officers in arrest situations
to the detriment of individual rights of privacy. The majority's approach, as Justice Marhsall remarked in his dissent, "represents a clear
and marked departure from our long tradition of case-by-ease adjudication of the reasonableness of searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment. 2 This approach was based on what the majority perceived as an overriding governmental interest in the function of the
custodial arrest, and was limited to that arrest situation.
Calandrawas a more difficult case in that it involved balancing
competing interests where the governmental interest was not overriding and where a categorical approach was inappropriate. Justice Powell provided a more scholarly, reasoned, and persuasive analysis of the
balancing of competing interests involved in extending the rule
to grand jury proceedings. Nonetheless, a similar result was reached
in all three cases. The interest in allowing the evidence obtained by
the search to be introduced in the proceeding was found to outweigh
the possible deterrent effect that an application of the rule would provide.
82. United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467, 478 (1973,) (dissenting opinion).
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The majority in Calandrabroadened the scope of its examination
beyond the fact situation before the Court to an analysis of the underlying justification of the exclusionary rule. The majority then framed
discussion of the various issues solely from the perspective of the rule's
deterrent value. As the dissent correctly pointed out, by requiring
only that the potential deterrent value of the rule in a particular context be weighed against the benefits of non-application, the Court rejected consideration of the "imperative of judicial integrity" and of
any inherent right of the person searched to have such evidence excluded. This construct opens the way to subsequent cases beyond the
context of Calandra in which the exclusionary rule may be limited
or abolished entirely if a showing can be made that the rule produces
little incremental deterrent value.
At least one member of the majority, the chief justice, indicated
that he believes the rule is not effective in deterring police misconduct, and that it costs society too high a price in terms of loss of evidence of crimes comrnittid and release of proven criminals. His recommendation was that the exclusionary rule be abolished and replaced
with an alternative. The three cases discussed in this note, particularly Calandra, may indicate that a majority of the Court agrees with
the chief justice. The groundwork appears to have been laid to accomplish what Chief Justice Burger advocated in his dissent in Bivens
-the abolition of the exclusionary rule and the establishment of a
legislative alternative, or in the very least, a limiting of the rule's ap3
plication to eliminate the anomalies it has produced.
This note will now examine several of the recent criticisms of
the exclusionary rule made by commentators and jurists, including
the alternative to the rule proposed by the chief justice. The conclusion presents an hypothesis as to the disposition of the majority of
the Court regarding the abolition of the exclusionary rule and its alternative replacement.
II.
Criticisms of the Exclusionary Rule
A.

Introduction
Although deterrence of police misconduct and protection of the
individual's right to freedom from invasion of his privacy are very important interests in our society, the exclusionary rule was not used to
implement these two goals until 1914. Judicial reluctance was due
largely to the harsh effect caused by the exclusion of otherwise rele83. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 424 (1971).
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vant evidence and the countervailing benefits to the functioning of the
courts by using this evidence to determine facts.8 4 Because of the
sacrifice such a rule represented to the social values of accurate judicial decision making and punishment of discovered crimes, reliance
was instead placed on various administrative, criminal, and civil remedies for enforcement of Fourth Amendment rights.
The exclusionary rule was adopted in the federal courts in
Weeks v. United States,8 5 when the Supreme Court determined that
these various remedies were not effective in suppressing lawless
searches and seizures, and that the exclusionary rule was the only effective means to deter such violations. This decision was followed
by various state courts, such as the California Supreme Court, which
created the exclusionary rule as a rule of evidence. 86 The United
States Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio87 subsequently made the exclusionary rule a constitutional mandate applicable to all the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite a lack of empirical evidence
to justify reliance on the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule at
its conception and even at present, jurists in cases applying the exclusionary rule made such statements as "experience has taught that [the
exclusionary rule] is the only effective deterrent to police misconduct
in the criminal context, and that without it the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere 'form of
words.' "88
Because of the controversial nature of the exclusionary rule and
the conflict it presents to the values of accurate judicial decision making, the rule has naturally had many opponents. A few of the more
frequent criticisms of the rule are that it "handcuffs the police," that
it "allows convicted rapists and murderers on the streets," and that it
represents "judicial legislation."8 9 Many of these comments represent
84. "Of all the two faced problems in the law, there is none more tormenting
than the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence. Whichever face one turns to the
wall, the question of admissibility remains a haunting one. The evidence may be of
the greatest relevance. If its admission serves to condone lawless enforcement, however, it opens the way to government intrusion on the privacy of law-abiding pople
...
." Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKn LJ. 319,
319.
85. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
86. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). "We have been compelled to [adopt the exclusionary rule] because other remedies have completely failed
to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers
." Id. at 445, 282 P.2d at 911.

87. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
88. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968), quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961) (emphasis added).
89. See, e.g., Reiss, Public Perceptions and Recollections About Crime, Law En-
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lay opinion based on little or no actual knowledge of the legal basis
of the rule. Such comments may be caused substantially by the
schools, media, courts, and legal community which have inadequately
explained the important values the rule protects. All too often the
emphasis has been placed on the harsh injustices of convicted felons
being freed on what most lay people (and many lawyers) would call
"technicalities."
Not all the criticism of the exclusionary rule is merely the angry
rhetoric of an outraged citizenry. One of the more effective and articulate voices to raise serious doubts as to the wisdom of this rule was
that of a then federal court of appeals judge for the District of Columbia.
B. Judge Warren Burger
In 1964, in an article entitled Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 90
Warren Burger, then a circuit judge, focused sharp criticism on the
use of the exclusionary rule as the sole tool for deterring piolice misconduct. From his vantage point, this appeared to be the principal
reason accepted by the Supreme Court for the suppression of illegally
obtained evidence. Judge Burger had not attempted to marshal statistics to justify abandoning the "suppression doctrine," but rather suggested a new mechanism to help that doctrine accomplish its goal of
deterring illegal police searches. 9 '
Judge Burger's most telling argument was that the record on the
exclusionary rule did not show that suppression of evidence affected
police conduct. He based this conclusion on an analysis of the exclusionary rule's purported goal of deterring such misconduct, and then
reasoned that the deterrent factors underpinning the rule were in fact
myth.
Judge Burger first indicated that deterrence meant something
undesirable would happen to the individual police officer. A court's
application of the exclusionary rule, he noted, did not result in a direct
sanction against the individual officer involved. 2 The rule's effect
forcement, and Criminal Justice, 1

STUDIEs iN CRiME & LAw ENFORC.MENT IN MA-

METhOPOLITAN ARAs § 1, at 81-85 (1967).
90. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. Rav. 1 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Burger].
91. Id. at 2, 10, 13.
92. Id. at 11. Professor Dallin Oaks gives a more sophisticated evaluation of
this objection in his collection of analyses of various scholars on aspects of deterrence.
Oaks, supra note 67.
Oaks begins by specifying different aspects of deterrence, including special deterrence. Special deterrence is the effect of a sanction on an individual who has already
experienced it. Since the exclusionary rule does not impose any direct punishment,
but only possible disappointment at seeing evidence suppressed and consequently seeing
the suspect freed, it is not aimed at special deterrence. Furthermore, according to
JOR
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was therefore limited to its indirect sanction. Whatever undesirable
effect the indirect sanction might have on the officer was seriously
diluted, however, because of the time lag between the policeman's
improper conduct and the final judgment. Sometimes the officer did
not even learn of the ultimate disposition of the case in which he committed an unconstitutional act. And even where he or his associates
were informed about the case, these professionals, along with their

fellow citizens, often did not understand the complexities of the newly
created law. Judge Burger pointed out an additional defect. Many
of the court opinions indicated a perception of law enforcement as
a monolithic unit, and either expressly or impliedly stated that suppression of evidence illegally obtained by the policeman will impress the
zealous prosecutor who will instruct the police not to engage in such
conduct. Such
a simplistic perception, Judge Burger contended, was
93
inaccurate.
Oaks, there is no evidence of individual sanctions against officers by superiors being
tied to application of the exclusionary rule. id. at 709-10.
The exclusionary rule is therefore meant to achieve its goals by general deterrence, which includes two kinds of effects, one immediate and the other long range,
by discouraging violations by individuals who have never experienced any sanction
against them. The immediate or direct deterrence, manifested in compliance induced
by the threat of the sanction, depends on numerous factors for its effectiveness, including: how effectively the rule is communicated to the individual officer and his realization that the evidence will be inadmissible in court if he makes an unconstitutional
search; how gravely the officer perceives the consequences of excluding evidence, and
upon how these compare to any competing alternatives he may have. Id. at 710-11.
Indirect and long range effects operate in three ways as a probable deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 4245 (1968); Andenaes, Does Punishment Deter Crime?, 11 CRIM. L.Q. 76, 80-81
(1968); Zimring, Perspectives on Deterrence (Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency, National Institute of Mental Health, Monograph Series, 1970).
The first, and probably most important, is the "moral or educative" influence of
the rule in teaching what society accepts and what it will not accept as appropriate
personal behavior. It should be noted that the effect of this influence probably depends
on the police official's view of whether the majority of society agrees with the courtmade rule and his general concept of the function of the judiciary.
The second indirect effect is that the rule helps develop patterns or habits of conforming behavior that continue to influence an individual's conduct long after he has
ceased to weigh the pros and cons of observance, particularly as to those aspects of
conduct that become highly routine.
The third indirect effect is that it gives a potential offender an additional reason
to resist the temptation and thus to reinforce the position of those officials who need
only this additional incentive to guarantee their compliance with the law. Oaks, supra,
at 711-12.
Although it is argued that the exclusionary rule has little direct deterrent effect,
over the long run the moral and educative force of the rule most likely produces some
sense of moral obligation. Id. at 729.
93. Burger, supra note 90, at 13; see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 44 (1949).
See text accompanying notes 109-110 infra.
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Judge Burger then remarked that the supposition that suppression
of illegally obtained evidence deters future action on the part of the
particular policeman is no more than "wishful thinking." ' 4 He concluded
that the proper objective should be to get the watchman, the policeman, to watch over himself, and then proposed an alternative tool to
supplement the exclusionary rule which would redirect this collective
flagellation to the individual public officials who commit wrong.9e
The alternative remedy, according to Judge Burger, should be
an independent civilian police review board which would determine
how and why an incident occurred, fix responsibility, make recommendations as to suspensions or discipline, and take any additional steps
necessary to prevent further occurrences.9 6
Judge Burger's final word was a sharp denunciation of the purpose and effect of the exclusionary rule:
The public has accepted-largely on faith in the Judiciary-the
distasteful results of the Supression Doctrine; but the wrath of
public opinion may descend alike on police and judges if we persist in the view that suppression is a solution. At best it is a
necessary evil and hardly more than a manifestation of sterile judicial indignation even in the view of well motivated and well
informed laymen. We can well ponder whether any community
is entitled to call itself an "organized society" if it can find no
way to solve this problem except by suppression of truth in the
search for truth. 97
C. Dallin Oaks
1.

Introduction

Unfortunately, most of the arguments made by Judge Burger, like
most of the theoretical underpinnings postulated by the judges creating the exclusionary rule, are based only on theory. There was little
to no firm empirical data on the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule
in deterring police misconduct.9" The legal community needed, and
in 1970 received, a partial installment to meet the need for a basis
of evaluating the proven effectiveness of the rule in the well-written
94. Burger, supra note 90, at 12.
95. Id. at 15.
96. Id. at 17-19.
97. Id. at 23.
98. At the time Mapp v. Ohio was decided, the only published empirical evidence
on the rule's deterrent effect included eleven responses to Justice Murphy's inquiries
about the extent of police training in areas with and without the rule, a student comment suggesting that the rule did not deter unlawful searches in enforcing gambling
laws in Chicago in 1950, and some writings intended to show law enforcement had
not been crippled in areas where the rule was adopted. Oaks, note 67 supra, at 675.
See note 100 infra.
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and well-documented article by Dallin H. Oaks, 99 a University of Chicago law professor and Executive Director of the American Bar Foundation.
In a careful and balanced presentation, Professor Oaks presented
the historical and theoretical basis of the exclusionary rule and its emphasis on deterring police misconduct, and then reviewed the current
research, as well as the various previously published studies on the
rule's deterrent effect. He also discussed possible techniques and areas
for further research suggested by these studies and by analyses of spe-

cific theoretical problems with regard to the rule. 00

Oaks used this preliminary background material to provide a
comprehensive detailing of specific limitations upon the effectiveness
of the exclusionary rule as a means of deterring illegal searches and

seizures, as well as its specific negative effects.1' 1 In gathering to-

gether and evaluating the prominent authorities who have commented
on this subject, Oaks strengthened the position advocated in the Burger article. As Oaks himself admitted, he "provide[d] ammunition

for those who would seek to abolish or restrict its application.' '

2

99. Oaks, note 67 supra.
100. The research methods used to gather the various data and recommended for
future studies included a before-and-after method of comparison of conduct in jurisdictions that have the exclusionary rule with those that do not, a field observation in
a single area during a single period of time to determine the effect of the rule, and
various opinion evidence by experts. The various studies included: the first recorded
test to evaluate empirically the assumptions underlying the exclusionary rule, a questionnaire sent to 38 large cities by Justice Murphy and described in his dissent to Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 44-46 (1949), which unfortunately was sorely lacking in
scope of questioning and in scientific method; a more adequate survey seeking opinions
on police training and other effects of the rule which was sent to five persons in each
state by Stuart Nagel in 1963 (Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized
Evidence, 1965 Wis. L. Rtv. 283); court statistics measuring the incidence of motions
to suppress in Chicago and the District of Columbia; comparative studies of arrest and
conviction for weapons, narcotics, and gambling offenses before and after the adoption
of the rule in Cincinnati over a period of five years before and six years after the
adoption of the rule; a study of the amount of contraband or illegally possessed material seized by police in Cincinnati during periods before and after the Mapp decision;
a very valuable study made by Columbia Law School students of evidentiary grounds
for arrest and subsequent disposition of misdemeanor narcotics cases in New York City
before and after Mapp (Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOCIAL PROB. 87 (1968) ); detailed
observation of police behavior in a book by Jerome Skolnick (J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE
Wrrotrr TRIAL (1967)) and by Wayne LaFave in his American Bar Foundation field
study of arrest practices in Kansas, Michigan and Wisconsin during 1956-57 (W. LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DECISION To TAKE A SusPEcT INTo CUSTODY (1965)); and a
superficial discussion by Oaks of how Canada discourages illegal behavior by its law
enforcement officials without use of an exclusionary rule. Oaks, supra note 67, at 678706.
101. Oaks, supra note 67, at 720-54.
102. Id. at 720.
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Because of the significance of Oaks' arguments, findings, and
conclusions to the thesis of this note, the author has taken the liberty
of paraphrasing the Oaks article extensively.
2.

Limitations on the Effectiveness of the Rule

The first specific limitation noted by Oaks on the rule's deterrent
effect is that it operates only when a case comes to court and where
there is an attempt to introduce the illegally obtained evidence to obtain a conviction. As the Supreme Court noted in Terry v. Ohio:10 3
Regardless of how effective the rule may be where obtaining convictions is an important objective of the police, it is powerless to
deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forego
10 4
successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal.
Instances involving conduct where the rule would be applicable would
seem to be a small minority of cases where there is an actual illegal
search and seizure. Moreover, evidence will not be suppressed in the
large majority of cases where the person illegally searched pleads
05

guilty.1

A second major limitation on the effectiveness of the exclusionary
rule is that it operates under conditions which are unfavorable for effective general deterrence, at least by means of direct effect. 0 6 Citing the writings of Johannes Andenaes' 0 7 and other scholars on this
point, Professor Oaks stated that the effectiveness of the rule will be
affected by the following conditions:
Risk of detection, conviction and punishment. "Rejection of
the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing official. .. .
The policeman who conducts the unreasonable search and seizure is
neither affected by money damages nor criminal punishment. The
perceived risk of unwanted detection and adjudication of fault is slight,
and once in a courtroom, doubts are usually resolved in favor of the
police officer. Furthermore, these police officers are rarely disciplined by their superiors for their misconduct which causes evidence
to be suppressed. 0 9
103. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
104. Id. at 14.
105. Oaks, supra note 67, at 720-24; see PREsmEN's

COMM'N ON LAW ENFoRcE-

MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY

91(1967).
106. See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
107. Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. Rv.
949, 960-64 (1966).
108. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
109. Oaks, supra note 67, at 725-26. See also Burger, supra note 90, at 12.
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Severity of penalty. The immediate impact of the exclusionary
rule is misplaced. It falls upon the prosecutor attempting to obtain
a conviction rather than upon the police. While the exclusionary rule
may be well tailored to deter the prosecutor from improper conduct,
it is less appropriate to deter police, who are generally independent
and coordinate authorities, but operate under a variety of motives other than to facilitate prosecution. 110
Competing norms of behavior. Any direct deterrent effect of
the rule is neutralized by the perceived needs of the situation and
by the competing norms of police behavior. Even if a police officer's
conduct was illegal and resulted in the loss of a conviction, according
to the observations of Jerome Skolnick, the officer would be disciplined only if he failed to behave as a reasonable officer in conformity
with administrative norms of police organization."' The policeman
is more oriented toward approaching events that threaten order
in terms of "handling the situation" rather than in terms of "enforcing
the law."" 2 Furthermore, the operation of the rule does not have
a reforming effect over competing norms of police behavior in many
areas since it is the conduct of the individual officer rather than the
policy of the department which is being reviewed." 3
Effective communication. The sanction and the reasons for the
sanction must be communicated to the target population to be an effective general deterrent. There is reason to believe that communication between
police, courts, and prosecutors is insufficient in this re11 4
spect.
In order to have a direct deterrent effect, and to accomplish the
rule's long range moral and educative goals, the various laws and decisions must be stated with sufficient clarity to be understood and followed by the average police officer. Due to the unquestioned complexity of rules dealing with arrest and search and seizure, this area
would not appear to be a favorable one for a deterrent sanction to
be effective. The degree of effectiveness of such a sanction varies
greatly in relation to the gravity of the suspect's crime. The question
of whether prosecution is assured or public interest in the case
110.
111.
112.
113.

Oaks, supranote 67, at 726-27.
J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WrToUT TRIAL 219 (1966).

1. WiLsON,

VAutETms OF

POLICE BEH&VIOR, at chs. 1, 2, 9 (1968).

PRESmENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADINISTATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FoRCE REPORT: THE POLICE 31-33 (1967).
114. LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making

and Reviewing Lzv Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987, 1005 (1965); LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule, 30 Mo. L. REv.
391, 415-21 (1965); Oaks, supranote 67, at 730.
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is aroused is also important.1 15
3.

Negative Effects of the Exclusionary Rule

Professor Oaks also presented some of the possible negative
effects of the rule which represent disadvantages or costs to society
for its implementation, regardless of whether or not it effectively deters police misconduct. These effects include the following.
Nothing for the innocent, but freedom for the guilty.

In terms

of direct corrective effect, the rule only benefits a person incriminated
by illegally obtained evidence. It does nothing to recompense the victim who has suffered an injury when the search failed to turn up anything incriminating.1 16 Justice Robert Jackson articulated his objec-

tion to this condition in this fashion:
Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrongdoing
official, while it may, and likely will, release the wrongdoing defendant. It deprives society of its remedy against one lawbreaker
because he has been pursued by another. It protects one against
whom incriminating evidence is discovered, but does nothing to
protect innocent persons who are the victims of illegal but fruitless
searches.11't

It has been argued that complaints about the exclusionary rule
freeing the guilty seem to be "less an assault on the exclusionary rule
than upon the validity of the substantive right sought to be protected

by constitutional provisions forbidding unreasonable searches and

seizures.""18 This argument would seem to be an overstatement,
however, since the rule is patently deficient in its failure to give direct
protection to the innocent as well as the guilty, notwithstanding its
purported effect of deterring unreasonable searches and seizures.
115. Oaks, supra note 67, at 731-32. As Jerome Skolnick concludes: "[AIU these
reasons-the norm of police alertness; the requirement that police confiscate illegal substances; the tendency toward a presumption of the legality of the search once the illegal substance is found; the fact that in a 'small pinch' the policeman is usually not
interested in an arrest but in creating an informant; the fact that the defense will be
impressed by the presence of incriminating evidence; the sympathy of police superiors
so long as policemen act in conformity with administrative norms of police organization; the difficulty of proving civil suits for false arrest . . .- militate against the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule. In short the norms of the police are fundamentally pragmatic. Since the policeman has everything to gain and little to lose when
he uses the 'reasonableness of the search and seizure' standard in small cases, he does
so, even though this is not the prevailing legal standard." J.SKOLNICK, Jusncn WrrHouT TRIAL 224 (1966).
116. Oaks, supra note 67, at 736-39.
117. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954) (dissent); see 8 WIGmORE ON
EVmENcE § 2184, at 51-52 (McNaughton ed. 1961); Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule
and Misconduct by The Police, 52 J. CruM. L.C. & P.S. 255, 256 (1961).
118. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties,
45 Nw. U.L REv. 1, 19 (1950).
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Fostering false testimony by the police. To the extent that police
officers avoid the operation of the exclusionary rule by deliberate false
testimony about the circumstances of the arrest or search and
seizure," 9 the exclusionary rule not only fails to achieve its own objectives, but it also corrupts law enforcement officials and degrades
the whole system of criminal justice.12 0
Delay and diversion from the question of guilt *orinnocence. A
criminal prosecution of one person would seem an indirect and awkward forum for inquiring into the behavior of some other person, a
police officer, with a view to punishing him or creating some deterrent
against similar conduct in the future. One commentator has summarized the arguments on this negative effect:
The [exclusionary] rule attempts to redress a violation of
law without the time-honored method of direct complaint and trial
on a carefully defined issue. The procedure looking toward exclusion of evidence interrupts, delays, and confuses the main issue
at hand-the trial of the accused. The principal proceeding 21may
be turned into a trial of the police rather than of the defendant.Side effects on the criminal justice system. Although a systems
analysis technique would be required to identify the number of uncertainties concerning various causes of change in the legal system,
according to Professor Oaks the exclusionary rule seems to have produced several undesirable side effects on the criminal justice system.
One such effect, noted by Edward Barrett, Jr., is that the rule creates
pressure upon courts to weaken the rules governing probable cause
to make an arrest where an obviously guilty defendant is seeking to
suppress clear physical evidence of his guilt.' 2 Another side effect
is that motions to suppress may be responsible for some delay in the
disposition of individual cases. The rule may also have an important
and detrimental effect upon the timing and substance of guilty-plea
bargaining and related sentencing decisions. This negative effect is
especially apparent in areas where bargaining occurs before the motion to suppress is litigated. 2 '
Police immunization of criminals. In addition to the cost of free119. J. SKOLNICK, JusTicE WrrHoUT TRIAL 215 (1966); Comment, Effect of Mapp
v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. &
SOCIAL PROB. 87 (1968).
120. Oaks, supra note 67, at 740.
121. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 . CRIM.
L.C. &P.S. 255, 256-57 (1961).
122. Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment, 1960

Sup. Or. Ray. 46, 55; see 8 WiGMOR ON EvmDNcn § 2184, at 52 n.44 (McNaughton
ed. 1961); Kitch, The Supreme Court's Code of Criminal Procedure: 1968-1969 Edi-

tion, 1969 Sup. Or. REv. 155, 157-58.
123. Oaks, supranote 67, at 747-49.
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ing the guilty by applying the exclusionary rule to any evidence that
is essential to the prosecution, there is an additional negative effect
in the dangerous power this vests in the police, permitting them to
immunize a criminal from prosecution by deliberately making an unreasonable search and seizure. One context in which it has been suggested that a police officer might be tempted to make a bad arrest
purposely is in a juvenile case to assure that the juvenile cannot be
found guilty and be subjected to a harsh penalty. Other contexts involving intentional misconduct based on corruption of the officer are
1 24
also conceivable.
Forestalling the development of alternative remedies. The exclusionary rule cannot be replaced as long as it remains a constitutional mandate, but it could be supplemented, particularly in areas where
it has proven ineffective. One negative side effect of the concentration and reliance upon the rule, however, may be to forestall the development of alternative mechanisms for controlling police misconduct.
Due to the federal preemption of Mapp, the rule may have the specific
effect of discouraging states to develop alternative methods of deterrence other than the exclusionary rule.'25
These negative aspects of the rule are costs which society must
pay and must be weighed when evaluating the value of the exclusionary rule in protecting the individual's Fourth Amendment rights.
D. Chief Justice Burger and the Bivens Case
In 1972, after he was elevated to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger used Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 26 as a platform to voice his continued disagreement with the exclusionary rule whose "history ...
demonstrates that it is both conceptually sterile and practically ineffective in accomplishing its stated objective."'' 27 Although the Bivens
124. Id. at 749-50; see Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46
Nw. U.L. REV. 385, 390-92 (1951).
125. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, I., concurring); Oaks, supra note 67, at 753.
126. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
127. Id. at 415 (dissenting opinion). The case held that federal narcotics
agents who, without a warrant or probable cause, entered the plaintiffs apartment to
arrest him and subject him to a strip search, violated the Fourth Amendment; consequently, their acts gave rise to a federal cause of action for damages against the individuals despite the lack of a statutory basis for such civil suit. On remand of a reserved question, the Second Circuit held that the agents did not have executive immunity for their acts performed under color of federal law, but they did have a special
defense of "good faith and reasonable belief." That holding rejected a long line of standing precedent extending the immunity privilege to low ranking federal officers. 456 F.2d
1339 (2d Cir. 1972). For a scholarly and well-researched analysis of Bivens on re-
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holding represented an attempt to provide an additional remedy to
supplement the suppression doctrine (the same objective he had pre28
viously encouraged by use of an independent police review board),
the chief justice in his dissent argued that it was inappropriate for
the courts to take such a step. Furthermore, he maintained that an
entirely different approach to this problem was required. Relying to
a great extent on the Oaks study for a marshaling of facts indicating
the exclusionary rule's ineffectiveness,1 29 Chief Justice Burger advocated that the rule be abolished and replaced with a legislative alterna30
tive.'

The chief justice employed the same arguments and much of the
same language utilized in his previous article 31 to justify his opposition
to the rule, as well as the analysis and conclusions of Oaks and some
of the other authorities cited previously in this note. He demanded
some clear demonstration of the benefits and effectiveness of the rule
to justify its use in view of the high price society must pay by "the
32
release of countless guilty criminals.'
Claiming that the doctrine represents a mechanically inflexible
response to widely varying degrees of police error, Chief Justice Burger commended attempts to provide rationally graded responses to
police error acquiring evidence, such as the American Law Institute's
33
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.
Emphasizing that the reporters were not wedded to the exclusionary rule as the sole or best means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment, the writers of the American Law Institute's draft had recommended that a motion to suppress evidence be granted only if the
court finds that the violation involved was substantial. The factors
to be considered in such a determination would include: the importance of the particular interest violated; the extent of deviation from
lawful conduct; the extent to which the violation was willful; the extent to which privacy was invaded; the extent to which exclusion would
tend to prevent violations of this code; whether, but for the violation, the things seized would have been discovered; and the extent
to which the violation prejudiced the moving party's ability to support
mand, see Note, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents: A New Direction in Federal
Police Immunity, 24 HASTINGS L.J 987 (1973).
128. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
129. Compare text accompanying note 91 supra.
130. 403 U.S. at 411-27.
131. Burger, supra note 90.
132. 403 U.S. at 416. See also Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment:
A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 33 n.172.
133. 403 U.S. at 419, 424-26, quoting ALI, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENr
F OCEDu
§ SS 8.02(2), (3) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1971).
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his motion, or to defend himself in the proceedings in which the things
seized were offered in evidence against him. The fruits of prior unlawful searches were also required to be suppressed unless the prosecution could meet the burden of proving that the evidence would probably have been discovered by the officials regardless of the illegal act,
and the exclusion would not be necessary to deter further violations.'
The chief justice stated that in criticizing the exclusionary rule
he was not faulting the judges who had originally created the rule
to enforce the Fourth Amendment, "[b]ut we can and should be faulted for clinging to an unworkable and irrational concept of law. My
criticism is that we have taken so long to accomplish these desired
1 35
objectives. And there are better ways."'
Chief Justice Burger was not advocating the overruling of Weeks
and Mapp and the abandonment of the exclusionary rule without first
developing some meaningful alternative.'"" His recommendation was
that Congress and the various state legislatures should adopt an administrative or quasi-judicial remedy of damages against the government itself to compensate persons whose Fourth Amendment rights
were violated: "The venerable doctrine of respondeat superior in our
tort law7 provides an entirely appropriate conceptual basis for this rem13
edy."1
Chief Justice Burger stated that such a quasi-judicial tribunal,
perhaps patterned after the United States Court of Claims, with lawyers serving as fact finders rather than lay jurors with less objective
standards, would obviate the criticism which suggests that lay prejudice against "criminals" would prevent recovery of damage claims. In
addition to the damage action, disciplinary or other internal measures
could be taken against the offending officer. Finally, appellate judicial review would be available under current administrative law standards to determine and articulate standards, thus replacing the moral
and educative purpose of the exclusionary rule.188
134. Id.
135. 403 U.S. at 420.
136. Id. at 420-21. Compare Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971), decided the same day as Bivens, in which
Harlan did advocate overruling Mapp and Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), because he saw them as being primarily responsible for serious distortions and incongruities in the law of search and seizure. Citing the Oaks article, Justice Harlan expressed
disapproval of the states being governed by federal law on search and seizure, thus
depriving the country of the opportunity to observe the effects of different procedures
in similar settings.
137. 403 U.S. at 422, citing W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TopTs § 68 (3d ed. 1964);
cf. Mathes & Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers
in Damage Actions, 53 GEo. L.J 889, 907-08 (1965).
138. 403 U.S. at 423.
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If the exclusionary rule were abolished and Congress replaced it
with such an alternative, the major faults of the rule would be removed-completely innocent persons who were victims of illegal police misconduct would have a remedy, and the otherwise relevant evidence suppressed under the rule would not be available to the court.
Furthermore, such a remedy would provide a flexible response to various degrees 9of illegal conduct which is impossible under the exclu13
sionary rule.
One of the chief justice's final comments quite appropriate to the
scope of this note deserves mention:
Independent of the alternative embraced in this dissenting opinion,
I believe the time has come to re-examine -the scope of the exclusionary rule and consider at least some narrowing
of its thrust
140
so as to eliminate the anomalies it has produced.
Fate of the Exclusionary Rule Under the Burger Court
When the exclusionary rule was judicially created as a means of
deterring unreasonable intrusions upon individual constitutional rights
by the police, the judges recognized the sacrifice such exclusion of
admittedly probative evidence represented to the social values of accurate judicial decision making and punishment of the discovered
crimes. Because other remedies were ineffective, however, and because the exclusionary rule was considered "the only effective means
of deterrence" of such misconduct, these judges determined that the
sacrifice involved was outweighed by the protection of important individual rights.
Since the creation of this remedy, commentators and critics such
as Dallin Oaks and Chief Justice Burger have presented persuasive
evidence and arguments that the rule rests on weak foundations.
There is reason to believe the rule is not effective in deterring police
misconduct. Its limitations, primarily its failure to protect the large
number of persons who plead guilty to an offense and those whose
Fourth Amendment rights are violated but are not prosecuted, along
with the various negative effects or costs associated with application
of the rule, warrant replacing it with some other alternative.
139. "Unlike the exclusionary rule, [damages] could provide graded responses to
police misconduct and give citizens some degree of direct control over police conduct.
Such a sanction could also express social disapproval of unconstitutional searches
equally as well as presently expressed by the exclusionary rule." Note, Money Damages for UnconstitutionalSearches: Compensation or Deterrence?, 1972 UTAH L. RFrv.
276, 280. Complete analysis of Chief Justice Burger's alternative and whether it corrects or improves the specific limitations and negative effects of the exclusionary rule
is beyond the scope of this note.
140. 403 U.S. at 424.
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The Robinson, Gustafson, and Calandracases indicate a distinct
shift in the attitude of the majority of the Supreme Court in evaluating whether the exclusionary rule should be extended to additional
contexts involving illegal searches and seizures. The majority's failure
to extend the rule in these cases, as well as the implication discussed
previously of making the deterrent effect of the rule the sole justification for its application, suggest that the majority agree with the findings of the rule's critics. Furthermore, the Court's actions imply that
presented with the proper case and statistical backing to prove the
rule's ineffectiveness, it might analyze the deterrent benefit of the rule
in criminal trials and find that the costs of the rule outweigh its benefits.
Even if the exclusionary rule is ineffective in deterring police misconduct, it would seem that the rule should not be abolished
before an appropriate alternative is developed, and it would be most
unlikely that the Court would take such a step. The most appealing
alternative appears to be that proposed by Chief Justice Burger in his
Bivens dissent, an alternative created by the legislature waiving sovereign immunity as to acts of police misconduct, the creation of a quasijudicial tribunal to adjudicate all claims of violation of the proposed
statute, and reliance upon money damages payable by the government
Internal police discipline, aided by recommendations
employer.
of this tribunal, would supplement this remedy and deter future
abuses. Review by the courts of decisions of this tribunal would also
be available to maintain the moral and educative role in articulating
the standards required by the Fourth Amendment. Such a plan would
eliminate many of the limitations and negative aspects of the exclusionary rule and would provide some measure of deterrence against
future misconduct.
As the chief justice advocated in his dissent in Bivens, the individual states may proceed and adopt their own legislation prior to
congressional approval. These states could create alternative remedies to the exclusionary rule based on the format suggested by Chief
Justice Burger, and make the damages remedy contingent on the
Court's declaring the exclusionary rule no longer a constitutional requirement. Such legislation, or similar federal legislation, would provide an appropriate vehicle to test the hypothesis urged by the rule's
critics. If the legislation were challenged, and then the action was
appealed to the Supreme Court, the rule could be proved ineffective
permitting, that the rule does
and the Court could hold, circumstances
141
not warrant being maintained.
141. Such a legislative proposal was introduced into the California Senate by Senator Lagomarsino and was supported by Governor Reagan. S.B. 1153 (1973), as
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Such a legislative alternative to the exclusionary rule would not
obviate the objection to pre-rule alternatives of the moral incongruity
of the state flaunting constitutional rights and at the same time demanding its citizens to observe the law. 142 As Justice Brennan stated
in his dissent to Calandra, requiring the person illegally searched to
seek redress in money damages only creates a situation where "officialdom may profit from its lawlessness if it is willing to pay a
'143
price.
The six man majority on the Court in recent cases has not been
persuaded by these arguments, however, and its reluctance to extend
the exclusionary rule in these three cases leads to the conclusion, based on the criticisms and studies showing the rule to be ineffective, that the Court may soon strike down the rule. Barring this drastic step, it appears that the present Court will not extend the exclusionary rule to other contexts and will review previous holdings and
declare that earlier determinations as to applicability of the rule are
no longer valid. 144

amended June 8, 1973. The bill died, however, when it failed to get out of its house
of origin by the required deadline, midnight January 30, 1974.
142. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 446-47, 282 P.2d 905, 912 (1955).
143. United States v. Calandra, 94 S. Ct. 613, 628 (1974).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 42 U.S.L.W. 4252 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1974);
United States v. Kahn, 42 U.S.L.W. 4245 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1974).

